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Abstract
The transition from classical to quantum mechanics rests on the recognition
that the structure of information is not what we thought it was: there are opera-
tional, i.e., phenomenal, probabilistic correlations that lie outside the polytope of
local correlations. Such correlations cannot be simulated with classical resources,
which generate classical correlations represented by the points in a simplex, where
the vertices of the simplex represent joint deterministic states that are the common
causes of the correlations. The ‘no go’ hidden variable theorems tell us that we
can’t shoe-horn correlations outside the local polytope into a classical simplex by
supposing that something has been left out of the story. The replacement of the
classical simplex by the quantum convex set as the structure representing proba-
bilistic correlations is the analogue for quantum mechanics of the replacement of
Newton’s Euclidean space and time by Minkowski spacetime in special relativity.
The nonclassical features of quantum mechanics, including the irreducible infor-
mation loss on measurement, are generic features of correlations that lie outside
the local correlation polytope. This paper is an elaboration of these ideas, and its
consequences for the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. A large part
of the difficulty is removed by seeing that the inconsistency in reconciling the en-
tangled state at the end of a quantum measurement process with the definiteness
of the macroscopic pointer reading and the definiteness of the correlated value of
the measured micro-observable is only apparent and depends on a stipulation that
is not required by the structure of the quantum possibility space. Replacing this
stipulation by an alternative consistent stipulation resolves the problem.
1 Introduction
What is quantum mechanics about? In the case of special relativity, the answer is clear:
special relativity is about the structure of space-time. The replacement of Newton’s
Euclidean space and time with a different geometric structure, Minkowski space-time,
in which space and time are relative to the state of motion of a system, followed from
the recognition of a property of light, that ‘there is never any overtaking of light by light
in empty space,’ as Hermann Bondi puts it [6, p. 27], together with a revised relativity
principle, that ‘velocity doesn’t matter for physics’ [6, p. 20], i.e., for electromagnetic
as well as mechanical phenomena.
1
A variety of answers have been proposed for quantum mechanics: that quantum
mechanics is about energy being quantized in discrete lumps or quanta, or that it is
about particles that are wavelike, or that it is about the universe, as we perceive it,
continually splitting into countless co-existing quasi-classical universes, with many
copies of ourselves, and so on. A more mundane answer is implicit in the theory
of quantum information: quantum mechanics is about probabilistic correlations, i.e.,
about the structure of information, insofar as a theory of information is essentially a
theory of probabilistic correlations. We live in a universe in which there are correlations
that lie outside the polytope of local correlations. Such correlations cannot be simulated
with classical resources, which generate classical correlations represented by the points
in a simplex, where the vertices of the simplex represent joint deterministic states that
are the common causes of the correlations. The replacement of the classical simplex
by the quantum convex set as the structure representing probabilistic correlations is the
analogue for quantum mechanics of the replacement of Newton’s Euclidean space and
time by Minkowski spacetime in special relativity.
The following discussion is an elaboration of this idea, and its consequences for the
measurement problem of quantum mechanics. §1 is an introduction to classical, quan-
tum, and superquantum correlations, and the differences between them. §2 considers
the question: if operational or phenomenal probabilistic correlations can lie outside
the local correlation polytope and hence cannot be simulated with classical resources,
what principle constrains these correlations to the convex set of quantum correlations?
Why not superquantum correlations? §3 is a discussion of two recent results, by Pusey,
Barrett, and Rudolph [24], and by Colbeck and Renner [13], about the interpretation
of quantum states. The issue is framed as the question of whether quantum states are
‘epistemic’ or ‘ontic.’ As we’ll see, the significance of these new results is more prop-
erly seen in relation to the Bell [2] and Kochen and Specker [20] ‘no go’ theorems
about possible extensions or completions of quantum mechanics, traditionally formu-
lated as the question of whether ‘hidden’ variables underly the probability distributions
defined by quantum states. §4 proposes a solution to the measurement problem as it
arises in this information-theoretic view of quantum mechanics.
2 Correlations
Consider the simple case of measurements of two binary-valued observables, x ∈
{0, 1} with outcomes a ∈ {0, 1}, performed by Alice in a region A, and y ∈ {0, 1}
with outcomes b ∈ {0, 1}, performed by Bob in a separated region B. Correlations
are expressed by a correlation array of joint probabilties as in Table 1. The probability
p(00|00) is to be read as p(a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0), i.e., as a joint conditional
probability, and the probability p(01|10) is to be read as p(a = 0, b = 1|x = 1, y = 0),
etc. (I drop the commas for ease of reading; the first two slots in p(−−|−−) before the
conditionalization sign | represent the two possible measurement outcomes for Alice
and Bob, respectively, and the second two slots after the conditionalization sign repre-
sent the two possible observables that Alice and Bob choose to measure, respectively.)
There are four probability constraints: the sum of the probabilities in each square
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x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) p(10|00) p(00|10) p(10|10)
p(01|00) p(11|00) p(01|10) p(11|10)
1 p(00|01) p(10|01) p(00|11) p(10|11)
p(01|01) p(11|01) p(01|11) p(11|11)
Table 1: Correlation array
cell of the array in Table 1 is 1, since the sum is over all possible outcomes, given the
two observables that are measured. The marginal probability of 0 for Alice or for Bob,
for a given pair of observables, is obtained by adding the probabilities in the left column
of each cell or the top row of each cell, respectively, and the marginal probability of 1
for Alice or for Bob, for a given pair of observables, by adding the probabilities in the
right column of each cell or the bottom row of each cell, respectively. The measurement
outcomes are uncorrelated if the joint probability is expressible as a product of marginal
or local probabilities for Alice and Bob; otherwise they are correlated.
Now consider all possible correlation arrays of the above form. They represent the
pure and mixed states of a bipartite system with two binary-valued observables for each
subsystem and form a regular convex polytope with 256 vertices, where the vertices
represent the extremal deterministic arrays or pure states with probabilities 0 or 1 only,
e.g., the array in Table 2.1 The polytope is the closed convex hull of the vertices,
i.e., the smallest closed convex set containing the vertices. There are four possible
arrangements of 0’s and 1’s that add to 1 in each square cell of the correlation array
(i.e., one 1 and three 0’s), and four cells, hence 44 = 256 vertices. The 16 probability
variables in the correlation array are constrained by the four probability constraints. It
follows that the 256-vertex polytope is 12-dimensional.2 A general correlation array is
represented by a point in this polytope, so the probabilities in the array can be expressed
(in general, non-uniquely) as convex combinations of the 0, 1 probabilities in extremal
correlation arrays (just as the probability of one of two alternatives, 0 or 1, can be
represented as a point on a line between the points 0 and 1 because it can be expressed
as a convex combination of the extremal end points).
The correlation array in Table 2 defines a set of correlations that allow instantaneous
signaling between Alice and Bob. Think of the x-values and a-values as Alice’s inputs
and outputs, respectively, and similarly for Bob with respect to the y-values and b-
values. So the two Alice-inputs (x = 0 or x = 1) correspond to the two Alice-
observables, and the two Bob-inputs (y = 0 or y = 1) correspond to the two Bob-
observables, and each observable can take two values, 0 or 1. In Table 2 , Alice’s
output is the same as Bob’s input. Similarly, Bob’s output is the same as Alice’s input.
So an input by Alice or Bob is instantaneously revealed in a remote output. There are
1A regular polytope is the multi-dimensional analogue of a regular polygon, e.g., an equilateral triangle,
or a square, or a pentagon in two dimensions. A convex set is, roughly, a set such that from any point in the
interior it is possible to ‘see’ any point on the boundary.
2Thanks to Tony Sudbury for clarifying this (private communication).
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240 similar signaling extremal deterministic correlation arrays in the total set of 256
extremal deterministic correlation arrays. The remaining 16 extremal deterministic
correlation arrays are no-signaling arrays.
x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) = 1 p(10|00) = 0 p(00|10) = 0 p(10|10) = 0
p(01|00) = 0 p(11|00) = 0 p(01|10) = 1 p(11|10) = 0
1 p(00|01) = 0 p(10|01) = 1 p(00|11) = 0 p(10|11) = 0
p(01|01) = 0 p(11|01) = 0 p(01|11) = 0 p(11|11) = 1
Table 2: Extremal signaling deterministic correlation array
The no-signaling principle can be formulated as follows: no information should be
available in the marginal probabilities of outputs in region A about alternative choices
made by Bob in region B, i.e., Alice, in region A should not be able to tell what Bob
measured in region B, or whether Bob performed any measurement at all, by looking
at the statistics of her measurement outcomes, and conversely. Formally:
∑
b
p(a, b|x, y) ≡ p(a|x, y) = p(a|x), y ∈ {0, 1} (1)
∑
a
p(a, b|x, y) ≡ p(b|x, y) = p(b|y), x ∈ {0, 1} (2)
Here p(a, b|x, y) is the probability of obtaining the pair of outputs a, b for the pair of
inputs x, y. The probability p(a|x, y) is the marginal probability of obtaining the output
a for x when Bob’s input is y, and p(b|x, y) is the marginal probability of obtaining
the output b for y when Alice’s input is x. The no-signaling principle requires Alice’s
marginal probability p(a|x, y) to be independent of Bob’s choice of input in region B
(and independent of whether there was any input in region B at all), i.e., p(a|x, y) =
p(a|x), and similarly for Bob’s marginal probability p(b|x, y) with respect to Alice’s
inputs: p(b|x, y) = p(b|y).
Note that the no-signaling principle is simply a constraint on the marginal probabil-
ities, not a relativistic constraint on the motion of a physical entity through space-time
per se—there is no reference to c, the velocity of light. What is excluded is that some-
thing happening here has an immediate effect over there. Communication between Al-
ice and Bob involves the exchange of messages encoded as physical signals that move
between them through space at a certain velocity. If this constraint were violated, then
instantaneous (and hence superluminal) signaling would be possible.
The joint probabilities in the 16 no-signaling deterministic correlation arrays can all
be expressed as products of marginal or local probabilities for Alice and Bob separately.
For example, the deterministic correlation array in which the outputs are both 0 for
all possible input combinations, as in Table 3, is a no-signaling array and the joint
probabilities can be expressed as a product of local probabilities: a marginal Alice-
probability of 1 for the output 0 given any input, and a marginal Bob-probability of 1
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for the output 0 given any input. This is, of course, not the case for the 240 signaling
deterministic correlation arrays.
x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) = 1 p(10|00) = 0 p(00|10) = 1 p(10|10) = 0
p(01|00) = 0 p(11|00) = 0 p(01|10) = 0 p(11|10) = 0
1 p(00|01) = 1 p(10|01) = 0 p(00|11) = 1 p(10|11) = 0
p(01|01) = 0 p(11|01) = 0 p(01|11) = 0 p(11|11) = 0
Table 3: Extremal no-signaling deterministic correlation array
Now suppose the correlations are as in Table 4. These correlations define a Popescu-
Rohrlich box (PR-box), a hypothetical device considered by Popescu and Rohrlich [23]
to bring out the difference between classical, quantum, and superquantum no-signaling
correlations.
x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) = 1/2 p(10|00) = 0 p(00|10) = 1/2 p(10|10) = 0
p(01|00) = 0 p(11|00) = 1/2 p(01|10) = 0 p(11|10) = 1/2
1 p(00|01) = 1/2 p(10|01) = 0 p(00|11) = 0 p(10|11) = 1/2
p(01|01) = 0 p(11|01) = 1/2 p(01|11) = 1/2 p(11|11) = 0
Table 4: PR-box correlation array
PR-box correlations can be defined as follows:
a⊕ b = x · y (3)
where ⊕ is addition mod 2, i.e.,
• same outputs (i.e., 00 or 11) if the inputs are 00 or 01 or 10
• different outputs (i.e., 01 or 10) if the inputs are 11
with the assumption that the marginal probabilities are all 1/2 to ensure no signaling,
so the outputs 00 and 11 are obtained with equal probability when the inputs are not
both 1, and the outputs 01 and 10 are obtained with equal probability when the inputs
are both 1.
A PR-box functions in such a way that if Alice inputs a 0 or a 1, her output is 0
or 1 with probability 1/2, irrespective of Bob’s input, and irrespective of whether Bob
inputs anything at all; similarly for Bob. The requirement is simply that whenever there
are in fact two inputs, the inputs and outputs are correlated according to (3).
A PR-box can function only once, so to get the statistics for many pairs of inputs
one has to use many PR-boxes. In this respect, a PR-box mimics a quantum system:
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after a system has responded to a measurement (produced an output for an input),
the system is no longer in the same quantum state, and one has to use many systems
prepared in the same quantum state to exhibit the probabilities associated with a given
quantum state.
The 16 vertices defined by the local no-signaling deterministic states are the ver-
tices of a polytope: the polytope of local correlations. The local correlation polytope
is included in a no-signaling nonlocal polytope, defined by the 16 vertices of the local
polytope together with an additional 8 nonlocal vertices, one of these nonlocal vertices
representing the standard PR-box as defined above, and the other seven vertices rep-
resenting PR-boxes obtained from the standard PR-box by local reversible operations
(relabeling the x-inputs, and the a-outputs conditionally on the x-inputs, and the y-
inputs, and the b-outputs conditionally on the y-inputs). For example, the correlations
in Table 5 define a PR-box. Note that the 16 vertices of the local polytope can all be
obtained from the vertex represented by Table 3 by similar local reversible operations.
Both the 16-vertex local polytope and the 24-vertex no-signaling nonlocal polytope are
8-dimensional: in addition to the four probability constraints (one for each cell in the
correlation array), there are four no-signaling constraints.3
x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) = 0 p(10|00) = 1/2 p(00|10) = 0 p(10|10) = 1/2
p(01|00) = 1/2 p(11|00) = 0 p(01|10) = 1/2 p(11|10) = 0
1 p(00|01) = 0 p(10|01) = 1/2 p(00|11) = 1/2 p(10|11) = 0
p(01|01) = 1/2 p(11|01) = 0 p(01|11) = 0 p(11|11) = 1/2
Table 5: Locally transformed PR-box correlation array (relative to Table 4)
Correlations represented by points in the local polytope can be simulated with clas-
sical resources, which generate classical correlations represented by the points in a
simplex, where the vertices represent joint deterministic states (extremal states) that
are the common causes of the correlations. Probability distributions over these ex-
tremal states—mixed states—are represented by points in the interior or boundary of
the simplex. A simplex is a regular convex polytope generated by n + 1 vertices that
are not confined to any (n−1)-dimensional subspace, e.g., a tetrahedron as opposed to
a square. The lattice of subspaces of a simplex (the lattice of vertices, edges, and faces)
is a Boolean algebra, with a 1-1 correspondence between the vertices, corresponding
to the atoms of the Boolean algebra, and the facets (the (n − 1)-dimensional faces),
which correspond to the co-atoms. The classical simplex—in this case a 16-vertex
simplex—represents the correlation polytope of probabilistic states of a bipartite clas-
sical system with two binary-valued observables for each subsystem; the associated
Boolean algebra represents the classical possibility structure.
Suppose Alice and Bob are allowed certain resources. What is the optimal proba-
bility that they can perfectly simulate the correlations of a PR-box?
3Bell’s locality conditions, which characterize the local polytope, are tighter no-signaling constraints:
no-signaling conditional on the values of local hidden variables.
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In units where a = ±1, b = ±1,4
〈00〉 = p(outputs same|00)− p(outputs different|00) (4)
so:
p(outputs same|00) = 1 + 〈00〉
2
(5)
p(outputs different|00) = 1− 〈00〉
2
(6)
and similarly for input pairs 01, 10, 11.
It follows that the probability of successfully simulating a PR-box is given by:
p(successful sim) = 1
4
(p(outputs same|00) + p(outputs same|01) +
p(outputs same|10) + p(outputs different|11)) (7)
=
1
2
(1 +
K
4
) =
1
2
(1 + E) (8)
where K = 〈00〉 + 〈01〉 + 〈10〉 − 〈11〉 is the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)
correlation.
Bell’s locality argument [2] in the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt version [12] shows
that if Alice and Bob are limited to classical resources, i.e., if they are required to repro-
duce the correlations on the basis of shared randomness or common causes established
before they separate (after which no communication is allowed), then |KC | ≤ 2, i.e.,
|E| ≤ 1
2
, so the optimal probability of successfully simulating a PR-box is 1
2
(1+ 1
2
) =
3
4
.
If Alice and Bob are allowed to base their strategy on shared entangled states pre-
pared before they separate, then the Tsirelson bound for quantum correlations requires
that |KQ| ≤ 2
√
2, i.e., |E| ≤ 1√
2
, so the optimal probability of successful simulation
limited by quantum resources is 1
2
(1 + 1√
2
) ≈ .85.
I use the term ‘nonlocal box’ to refer to any no-signaling device with a probability
array such that, using the nonlocal box, it is possible to successfully simulate a PR-box
(extremal nonlocal box) with a probability greater than the classical value of 3/4. We
live in a nonlocal box world: a pair of qubits in an entangled quantum state constitutes
a nonlocal box for certain pairs of measurements. As Popescu and Rohrlich observe,
relativistic causality does not rule out simulating a PR-box with a probability greater
than 1
2
(1 + 1√
2
): there are possible worlds described by superquantum theories that al-
low nonlocal boxes with no-signaling correlations stronger than quantum correlations,
in the sense that 1√
2
< E ≤ 1. The correlations of a PR-box saturate the CHSH
inequality (E = 1), and so represent a limiting case of no-signaling correlations.
4It is convenient to change units here to relate the probability to the usual expression for the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt correlation, where the expectation values are expressed in terms of ±1 values for x
and y (corresponding to the relevant observables). Note that ‘outputs same’ or ‘outputs different’ mean the
same thing whatever the units, so the probabilities p(outputs same|xy) and p(outputs different|xy) take the
same values whatever the units, but the expectation value 〈xy〉 depends on the units for x and y.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of part of the space of no-signaling correlations for
a bipartite system with binary input and output. The vertices L are the deterministic
vertices of the local no-signaling polytope. Correlations in this polytope can be simu-
lated with classical resources. The superquantum polytope is bounded by the sixteen
vertices L of the local polytope together with eight PR-box vertices, which represent
the strongest possible nonlocal correlations consistent with the no-signaling principle.
The quantum convex set is bounded by a continuous set of vertices and is not a poly-
tope. It lies between the 16-vertex local polytope and the 24-vertex superquantum
no-signaling nonlocal polytope.
For two binary-valued observables of a bipartite quantum system, the correlations
form a spherical convex set that is not a polytope, with a continuous set of extremal
points between the 16-vertex local correlation polytope characterized by Bell’s inequal-
ities (or the CHSH inequalities) and the 24-vertex no-signaling nonlocal polytope,
which is itself included in the 256-vertex nonlocal polytope with 240 vertices that
represent deterministic signaling states. By Bell’s theorem, only correlations in the
16-vertex local polytope can be classically simulated by points in a simplex, where the
vertices of the simplex represent joint deterministic states that are the common causes
of the correlations. See Fig. 1.
A simplex has the rather special property that a mixed state, represented by a point
in the interior of the simplex, can be expressed uniquely as a mixture (convex combi-
nation) of extremal or pure states, the vertices of the simplex. No other polytope or
convex set has this feature. So in the class of no-signaling theories, classical (= sim-
plex) theories are rather special. If there is no unique decomposition of mixed states
into deterministic pure states for the operational or phenomenal probabilities, as is the
case for the local 16-vertex polytope, then either there is some restriction on access to
the full information encoded in the pure states, i.e., there is something left out of the
story (which could, in principle, be added to complete the story as a simplex theory
in which the vertices represent the common causes of correlations), or the correla-
tions are outside the local polytope and there is no theoretical account that provides
an explanation of correlations in terms of deterministic pure states without violating
the no-signaling principle: any no-signaling explanation of correlations will have to
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include indeterministic states like PR-box states.
To illustrate this non-uniqueness for the local correlation polytope, which is not
a simplex, denote a deterministic state by the sequence −−;−−, where the first two
slots denote the two possible Alice-outputs for the two possible Alice-inputs, and the
second two slots after the semi-colon denote the two possible Bob-outputs for the two
possible Bob-inputs. The equal-weight mixture, m1, of the four deterministic states:
00; 00
11; 11
00; 11
11; 00
is equivalent to the equal-weight mixture,m2, of the four different deterministic states:
01; 01
10; 10
01; 10
10; 01
x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) = 1/4 p(10|00) = 1/4 p(00|10) = 1/4 p(10|10) = 1/4
p(01|00) = 1/4 p(11|00) = 1/4 p(01|10) = 1/4 p(11|10) = 1/4
1 p(00|01) = 1/4 p(10|01) = 1/4 p(00|11) = 1/4 p(10|11) = 1/4
p(01|01) = 1/4 p(11|01) = 1/4 p(01|11) = 1/4 p(11|11) = 1/4
Table 6: Correlation array associated with the two equivalent mixtures m1 and m2
Both mixtures correspond to the same point in the local correlation polytope, rep-
resented by the array in Table 6. For each mixture, the probabilities of the four possible
Alice-Bob outputs, 00, 01, 10, 11, are equal for any Alice-input and Bob-input. Also,
for each mixture, the marginal probabilities of Alice’s two possible outputs, 0 or 1,
are both 1/2, for any input, and similarly for Bob. So the two mixtures are equivalent
for Alice and for Bob, separately, assuming they each have access to only one input
and associated output at a time, and they are also equivalent for Alice and Bob jointly,
assuming they have access to only one pair of inputs and associated outputs at a time.
The mixtures can only be distinguished in a theory that assumes access to both inputs
and outputs at the same time, for Alice and for Bob. This is the case in a theory in
which the 16 deterministic states are represented by the vertices of a simplex, where
the representation of mixtures, represented by points in the simplex, in terms of pure
states, represented by the vertices, is unique. A 16-vertex simplex is a 15-dimensional
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polytope: there is only one probability constraint, that the sum of the sixteen proba-
bilities p(− − | − −) should sum to 1. The (operational) local correlation polytope
characterizes a situation where access to the information encoded in the simplex is
restricted.
If the operational or phenomenal correlations lie outside the local correlation poly-
tope, there there is no theoretical explanation of the correlations in terms of a simplex
theory, if we demand no violation of the no-signaling principle. Any theoretical ex-
planation of such correlations will have to involve indeterministic pure states, such as
PR-boxes, and the decomposition of mixed states into pure states will be non-unique.
For such theories, there can be no general cloning procedure capable of copying an
arbitrary extremal state without violating the no-signaling principle, and so there can
be no measurement in the non-disturbing sense available in classical theories, where
it is in principle possible, via measurement, to extract sufficient information about an
extremal state to produce a copy of the state without irreversibly changing the state.
For a nonlocal box theory, there is a necessary information loss on measurement.
To see this, consider a PR-box and suppose there is some parameter λ that Bob is
able to measure, and that Bob could somehow extract sufficient information via this
measurement to know the outputs of both possible inputs to his part of the PR-box.
Suppose Bob’s information is that the output values for his two possible inputs are j
and k.
Consider a reference frame in which Alice’s input occurs before Bob’s measure-
ment of λ. If j = k, then Bob can infer that Alice’s input was 0, because otherwise,
to satisfy the PR-box constraint (3), if Alice’s input was 1, Alice’s output would have
to be the same as Bob’s output value for his input 0, but different from Bob’s output
value for his input 1, which is impossible if Bob’s output values for his two inputs are
the same. Similarly, if j 6= k, then Bob can infer that Alice’s input was 1, because oth-
erwise, if Alice’s input was 0, Bob’s output values for his two inputs would have to be
the same as Alice’s output for her input 0, which would require Bob’s output values to
be the same. So the no-signaling principle is violated: Alice can signal instantaneously
to Bob.
Allen Stairs has pointed out5 that this conclusion follows only if Alice’s output
does not depend on Bob’s input, e.g., as in Table 7 for the case j = k and as in Table 8
for the case j 6= k. But if Alice’s output depends on Bob’s input, then Bob can signal
instantaneously to Alice, which again involves a violation of the no-signaling principle.
Now consider a reference frame in which Bob measures λ before Alice’s input.
Then there is a constraint on Alice’s choice of input: her input is 0 if Bob’s output
values for his inputs are the same, and her input is 1 if Bob’s output values for his inputs
are different. Again (Stairs’ clarification), this follows only if Alice’s output does not
depend on Bob’s input. But if Alice’s output is nonlocally contextual and depends
on Bob’s input, then there is a violation of the no-signaling principle rather than a
constraint on Alice’s freedom to choose her input. So either there is a violation of ‘free
choice,’ i.e., what is sometimes called ‘superdeterminism’—Alice’s input choice is not
free but is is determined (or, more generally, constrained) by the value of λ—or there
5Private communication.
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x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) = 1 p(10|00) = 0 p(00|10) = 1 p(10|10) = 0
p(01|00) = 0 p(11|00) = 0 p(01|10) = 0 p(11|10) = 0
1 p(00|01) = 1 p(10|01) = 0 p(00|11) = 0 p(10|11) = 1
p(01|01) = 0 p(11|01) = 0 p(01|11) = 0 p(11|11) = 0
Table 7: Bob’s output is 0 for all input pairs; Alice’s output is 0 for the input pairs
00, 01, 10, but 1 for the input pair 11, i.e., Alice’s output is nonlocally contextual and
depends both on her input and on Bob’s input.
x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) = 1 p(10|00) = 0 p(00|10) = 1 p(10|10) = 0
p(01|00) = 0 p(11|00) = 0 p(01|10) = 0 p(11|10) = 0
1 p(00|01) = 1 p(10|01) = 0 p(00|11) = 0 p(10|11) = 1
p(01|01) = 0 p(11|01) = 0 p(01|11) = 0 p(11|11) = 0
Table 8: Bob’s output is the same as his input; Alice’s output is 0 for the input pairs
00, 10, 11, but 1 for the input pair 01, i.e., Alice’s output is nonlocally contextual and
depends both on her input and on Bob’s input.
is a violation of the no-signaling principle.
Of course, the order of Alice’s and Bob’s inputs could depend on the reference
frame, but this does not alter the conclusion: if we reject the possibility of instantaneous
signaling, or we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s input choices are unconstrained or free,
in the sense that these choices are independent of any information that is in principle
available before the choices, then there must be a necessary information loss about the
output value for input 0 if Bob obtains information about the output value for input 1,
and conversely, and similarly for Alice.
For similar reasons, Bob can’t clone his part of a PR-box. Suppose he could. If Bob
inputs 0 into his part of a PR-box and 1 into the cloned part, then he could infer Alice’s
input from his two outputs if Alice’s input occurs before his inputs: same outputs
indicate that Alice’s input was 0; different outputs indicate that Alice’s input was 1. So
Alice could signal instantaneously to Bob. If Alice’s input occurs after Bob’s inputs,
then Alice’s input choice depends on whether Bob’s output values are the same or
different. Again (Stairs’ clarification), this conclusion follows only if Alice’s output
does not depend on Bob’s input. So if we assume that there is no constraint on Alice’s
freedom to choose her input, or that there is no violation of the no-signaling principle,
then cloning part of a PR-box is impossible.
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3 Why Quantum Correlations?
The quantum theory is a nonlocal box theory, i.e., it is a no-signaling theory with
counter-intuitive probabilistic features like those of a PR-box. Hilbert space as a pro-
jective geometry (i.e., the subspace structure of Hilbert space) represents the structure
of the space of possibilities and determines the kinematic part of quantum mechanics.
This includes the association of Hermitian operators with observables, the Born prob-
abilities, the von Neumann-Lu¨ders conditionalization rule, and the unitarity constraint
on the dynamics, which is related to the possibility structure via a theorem of Wigner
[29],[27]. The possibility space is a non-Boolean space in which there are built-in,
structural probabilistic constraints on correlations between events (associated with the
angles between the rays representing extremal events)—just as in special relativity the
geometry of Minkowski space-time represents spatio-temporal constraints on events.
These are kinematic, i.e., pre-dynamic, objective probabilistic or information-theoretic
constraints on events to which a quantum dynamics of matter and fields conforms,
through its symmetries, just as the structure of Minkowski space-time imposes spatio-
temporal kinematic constraints on events to which a relativistic dynamics conforms.
The transition from classical to relativistic physics resolves a conflict between a
contingent property of light, that there is no overtaking of light by light, and the Eu-
clidean structure of Newtonian space and time. It was Einstein’s genius to see that treat-
ing the Galilean relativity principle as a structural principle applying to all of physics,
i.e., to electromagnetic as well as dynamical phenomena (so the laws of physics are re-
quired to be the same in different reference frames moving at constant relative velocity)
yields Minkowski spacetime—to put it somewhat anachronistically, since of course it
was Minkowski who later codified Einstein’s insight in terms of a specific spacetime
structure.
Schematically:
• relativity principle (‘velocity doesn’t matter’), a structural principle applying to
all of physics
• light postulate (‘no overtaking of light by light’), a contingent property of light
• Newtonian spacetime Minkowski spacetime
Here is Lorentz’s reaction, from the conclusion of the 1916 edition of The Theory
of Electrons and its Applications to the Phenomena of Light and Radiant Heat [21]:
I cannot speak here of the many highly interesting applications which
Einstein has made of this principle [of relativity]. His results concerning
electromagnetic and optical phenomena . . . agree in the main with those
which we have obtained in the preceding pages, the chief difference being
that Einstein simply postulates what we have deduced, with some diffi-
culty and not altogether satisfactorily, from the fundamental equations of
the electromagnetic field. By doing so, he may certainly take credit for
making us see in the negative result of experiments like those of Michel-
son, Rayleigh and Brace, not a fortuitous compensation of opposing ef-
fects, but the manifestation of a general and fundamental principle.
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Yet, I think, something may also be claimed in favour of the form in
which I have presented the theory. I cannot but regard the aether, which
can be the seat of an electromagnetic field with its energy and its vibra-
tions, as endowed with a certain degree of substantiality, however differ-
ent it may be from all ordinary matter. In this line of thought, it seems
natural not to assume at starting that it can never make any difference
whether a body moves through the aether or not, and to measure distances
and lengths of time by means of rods and clocks having a fixed position
relative to the aether.
The analogous contingent fact for the quantum revolution is the existence of non-
local entanglement; specifically, that there are operational or phenomenal correlations
outside the local polytope. This requires extending the classical simplex structure for
probabilistic correlations to the quantum convex set. The no-signaling principle (a
structural constraint) requires that probabilistic correlations lie inside the no-signaling
polytope. But as Popescu and Rohrlich [23] first pointed out, the quantum convex set
is a proper subset of the no-signaling polytope—the no-signaling principle by itself
does not constrain probabilistic correlations to the quantum convex set. What is the
structural principle that constrains correlations to the quantum convex set inside the
no-signaling polytope?
• ?
• nonlocal entanglement (there are operational correlations outside the local poly-
tope), a contingent fact
• classical information: simplex structure of probabilistic correlations quantum in-
formation: quantum convex set for probabilistic correlations
There are various proposals in the literature for the ?-principle. The most promising
candidate, in my view, is the principle of information causality proposed by Pawlowski
et al [22]. Information causality is a generalization of the no-signaling principle. It can
be interpreted as a principle characterizing system separability, or a limitation of what
Bohr referred to as quantum ‘wholeness.’
Information causality says that Bob’s information gain about a data set of Alice
(previously unknown to him), on the basis of his local resources (which may be corre-
lated with Alice’s local resources) and a single use by Alice of an information channel
with classical capacity m, is bounded by the classical capacity of the channel. For
m = 0, this is equivalent to no signaling. Zukowski calls the principle ‘causal infor-
mation access.’6 The proposal is that quantum mechanics optimizes causal information
access.
Here is a simple way to see the significance of information causality as a constraint.
If Bob has to guess the value of any designated one of N bits held by Alice, and Alice
can send Bob just one bit of information, then Bob can do better exploiting quantum
correlations than classical correlations (shared randomness). Information causality sets
a limit on how much better he can do.
6Private communication
13
Suppose the probability of Bob guessing the k’th bit correctly is Pk. The binary
entropy of Pk is defined as:
h(Pk) = −Pk logPk − (1− Pk) log (1− Pk) (9)
If Bob knows the value of the bit he has to guess, Pk = 1, so h(Pk) = 0. If Bob
has no information about the bit he has to guess, Pk = 1/2, i.e., his guess is at chance,
and h(Pk) = 1. So h(Pk) varies between 0 and 1.
If Alice sends Bob one classical bit of information, information causality requires
that Bob’s information about the N unknown bits increases by at most one bit. If the
bits in Alice’s list are unbiased and independently distributed, Bob’s information about
an arbitrary bit b = k in the list cannot increase by more than 1/N bits, i.e., for Bob’s
guess about an arbitrary bit in Alice’s list, the binary entropy h(Pk) is at most 1/N
closer to 0 from the chance value 1: h(Pk) ≥ 1− 1/N .
So information causality is violated when h(Pk) < 1 − 1/N or, taking N = 2n,
the condition for a violation of information causality is h(Pk) < 1 − 12n . Since it can
be shown that Pk = 12 (1 + E
n) [22, 10], we have a violation of information causality
when h(1
2
(1 + En)) < 1− 1
2n
.
For classical correlations, E = 1
2
, so in the case n = 1 (where Bob has to guess
one of two bits), Pk = 34 , and:
h(Pk) ≈ .81
For quantum correlations,E = 1√
2
, so for n = 1, Pk = 12 (1 +
1√
2
) ≈ .85, and:
h(Pk) ≈ .60
For PR-box correlations,E = 1, so for all n, Pk = 1, and:
h(Pk) = 0
It can be shown that if E ≤ ET = 1√
2
, information causality is satisfied [22, 10],
i.e.,
h(
1
2
(1 + EnT )) ≥ 1 =
1
2n
, for any n (10)
If E > ET , information causality is violated.
If E is very close to the Tsirelson bound ET = 1√
2
≈ .707, then n must be very
large for a violation of information causality. For example, if n = 10 and E = .708,
then h(Pk) ≈ .99938. There is no violation of information causality because .99938 >
1− 1
1024
≈ .9990. In fact, we require n ≥ 432 for a violation of information causality
[10].
Quantum and classical theories satisfy information causality, but the question of
whether information causality by itself is sufficient to precisely delimit the quantum
convex set is still open. In the very special case of a bipartite system with two binary-
valued observables, Allcock et al [1] have been able to exclude all but a very small part
of the superquantum region on the basis of information causality.
It is rather striking how closely Lorentz’s reluctance to accept the theory of rela-
tivity is paralleled by Einstein’s reluctance to accept the significance of the quantum
revolution [15]:
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If one asks what, irrespective of quantum mechanics, is characteristic
of the world of ideas of physics, one is first of all struck by the following:
the concepts of physics relate to a real outside world, that is, ideas are es-
tablished relating to things such as bodies, fields, etc., which claim a ‘real
existence’ that is independent of the perceiving subject—ideas which, on
the other hand, have been brought into as secure a relationship as possible
with sense-data. It is further characteristic of these physical objects that
they are thought of as arranged in a physical space-time continuum. An
essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay
claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one another, pro-
vided that these objects ‘are situated in different parts of space.’ Unless
one makes this kind of assumption about the independence of the exis-
tence (the ‘being-thus’) of objects which are far apart from one another in
space—which stems in the first place from everyday thinking—physical
thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It is also hard to see
any way of formulating and testing the laws of physics unless one makes
a clear distinction of this kind.
4 The Interpretation of Quantum States
Schro¨dinger introduced the term ‘entanglement’ to describe the non-simplex proba-
bilistic correlations of quantum mechanics, specifically the correlations of entangled
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) states (quantum states of the sort considered by Ein-
stein, Podolsky, and Rosen [16] in their argument for the incompleteness of quantum
theory). He regarded entanglement as [25, p. 555]: ‘the characteristic trait of quantum
mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought.’
From this perspective (endorsed here), the transition from classical to quantum me-
chanics is the transition from a classical simplex theory to a non-simplex theory of
operational or phenomenal probabilistic correlations that lie outside the local poly-
tope. The conceptual problems of the theory reflect a clash between the structure of
the associated possibility space and the standard ontology that goes along with classi-
cal (simplex) correlations. As far as these problems are concerned, we might as well
consider the class of superquantum theories rather than quantum mechanics: the con-
ceptual problems are the same.
The existence of operational or phenomenal correlations outside the local correla-
tion polytope means that we have to give up Einstein’s view that physical objects have
a ‘being-thus’ (‘So-sein’ in German), in the sense that a physical object is character-
ized by definite properties prior to measurement that the observer is able to ascertain
via measurement.
Recently, a new result by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) [24] has created a
stir in the quantum foundations community. In a blog post by Matthew Leifer dated
November 20, 2011 (http://mattleifer.info/2011/11/20/can-the-quantum-state-be-interpreted-statistically/),
the issue is laid out particularly clearly:
We have seen that there are two clear notions of state in classical me-
chanics: ontic states (phase space points) and epistemic states (probability
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distributions over the ontic states). In quantum theory, we have a different
notion of state—the wavefunction—and the question is: should we think
of it as an ontic state (more like a phase space point), an epistemic state
(more like a probability distribution), or something else entirely?
Here are three possible answers to this question:
1. Wavefunctions are epistemic and there is some underlying ontic state.
Quantum mechanics is the statistical theory of these ontic states in
analogy with Liouville mechanics.
2. Wavefunctions are epistemic, but there is no deeper underlying real-
ity.
3. Wavefunctions are ontic (there may also be additional ontic degrees
of freedom, which is an important distinction but not relevant to the
present discussion).
I will call options 1 and 2 psi-epistemic and option 3 psi-ontic. Advo-
cates of option 3 are called psi-ontologists, in an intentional pun coined by
Chris Granade. Options 1 and 3 share a conviction of scientific realism,
which is the idea that there must be some description of what is going on
in reality that is independent of our knowledge of it. Option 2 is broadly
anti-realist, although there can be some subtleties here.
The theorem in the paper attempts to rule out option 1, which would
mean that scientific realists should become psi-ontologists. I am pretty
sure that no theorem on Earth could rule out option 2, so that is always
a refuge for psi-epistemicists, at least if their psi-epistemic conviction is
stronger than their realist one.
I would classify the Copenhagen interpretation, as represented by Niels
Bohr, under option 2. One of his famous quotes is:
There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical
description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to
find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about
nature . . .
and ‘what we can say’ certainly seems to imply that we are talking about
our knowledge of reality rather than reality itself. Various contemporary
neo-Copenhagen approaches also fall under this option, e.g. the Quantum
Bayesianism of Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs and Ruediger Schack; An-
ton Zeilinger’s idea that quantum physics is only about information; and
the view presently advocated by the philosopher Jeff Bub. These views
are safe from refutation by the PBR theorem, although one may debate
whether they are desirable on other grounds, e.g. the accusation of instru-
mentalism.
Pretty much all of the well-developed interpretations that take a realist
stance fall under option 3, so they are in the psi-ontic camp. This in-
cludes the Everett/many-worlds interpretation, de Broglie-Bohm theory,
and spontaneous collapse models. Advocates of these approaches are
likely to rejoice at the PBR result, as it apparently rules out their only
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realist competition, and they are unlikely to regard anti-realist approaches
as viable.
In the simple version of the argument, the authors consider preparing a quantum
system (a qubit) in one of two quantum states: |0〉 or |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), where
|〈0|+〉| = 1√
2
. Say |0〉 and |1〉 are eigenstates of z-spin, and |+〉 and |−〉 are eigenstates
of x-spin. The supposition of the theorem is that the epistemic states |0〉 and |+〉
overlap in the ontic state space. There is therefore a certain finite probability q that
preparing the system in either of these states will result in an ontic state λ in the overlap
region. If, now, two independent non-interacting systems are each prepared in either of
the quantum states |0〉 or |+〉, there is a probability q2 that the systems will be in ontic
states λ1, λ2 that are both in the overlap region. It follows that the ontic state of the 2-
qubit system (which the argument assumes is specified by the pair of local ontic states
(λ1, λ2), because the systems are independent and non-interacting)7 is compatible with
the four quantum states: |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, |0〉 ⊗ |+〉, |+〉 ⊗ |0〉, |+〉 ⊗ |+〉.
Now consider measuring an observable A on the 2-qubit system with entangled
eigenstates:
|0〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 (11)
|0〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |+〉 (12)
|+〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |0〉 (13)
|+〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |+〉 (14)
The outcome of the measurement should depend only on the ontic state, which
‘screens off’ future events from epistemic states (i.e., given the ontic state, an epistemic
state provides no further information relevant to the occurrence of the event). But,
according to quantum mechanics, the outcome corresponding to |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 + |1〉 ⊗ |0〉
is impossible (i.e., has zero probability) if the initial quantum state is |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, since
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉 is orthogonal to |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 + |1〉 ⊗ |0〉. Similarly, |0〉 ⊗ |+〉 is orthogonal to
|0〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |+〉, |+〉 ⊗ |0〉 is orthogonal to |+〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |−〉⊗ |0〉, and |+〉 ⊗ |+〉
is orthogonal to |+〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |+〉. So each of the four possible outcomes of the
measurement is impossible if the ontic state of the 2-qubit system is (λ, λ′). This is a
contradiction, since one of the outcomes must occur, i.e., the sum of the probabilities
of the four possible outcomes is 1.
The conclusion PBR draw is that the quantum state must be real, i.e., that the quan-
tum state must be (at least part of) the ontic state. The argument rules out Leifer’s third
possibility, that quantum states are epistemic: distinct quantum states must correspond
to physically distinct states of reality [24, p. 476]:
We have shown that the distributions for |0〉 and |+〉 cannot overlap. If the
same can be shown for any pair of quantum states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, then the
quantum state can be inferred uniquely from λ. In this case, the quantum
state is a physical property of the system.
7Note that it is not an assumption of the argument that λ = (λ1, λ2) is a common cause of any correla-
tions between the two systems. That is, for measurements of observables A,B on the 2-qubit system with
outcomes a for A and b for B, it is not required that p(a, b|λ) = p(a|λ)p(b|λ).
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They proceed to prove this, from which it would seem that the only viable options for
an interpretation that takes quantum mechanics as strictly true are Bohm’s theory or the
Everett interpretation, since Leifer’s second possibility (‘wave functions are epistemic,
but there is no deeper underlying reality’) is dismissed as instrumentalism. The general
argument involves considering n copies of the system, where n depends on the angle
between the states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 (the smaller the angle between the states, the larger
the number n of copies that needs to be considered).
The first thing to note here is that the PBR argument does not involve a locality
assumption, so this result is different from Bell’s related result [2]. But there is an
interesting relation with what Harvey Brown [8] calls ‘Bell’s other theorem’: Bell’s
proof of a corollary to Gleason’s theorem in [3], which anticipated the Kochen-Specker
theorem [20].
Bell showed that if, in a Hilbert space of more than two dimensions, two nonorthog-
onal pure states are assigned 0 and 1, respectively, then if these states are close enough
(i.e., if the angle between the rays is smaller than a certain angle), there exists a set of
rays that are impossible to ‘color’ noncontextually with 0’s and 1’s, consistently with
the orthogonality constraints (where consistency requires that if a ray is assigned 0, the
orthogonal ray is assigned 1, and conversely).
Consider any two pure states in a Hilbert space of any dimension (including di-
mension 2), say |ψ〉 and |φ〉. Suppose there is an ontic state λ compatible with both of
them. Represent this by assigning both states 1, where assigning 1 to a quantum state
qua epistemic state indicates that the ontic state is in the support of the quantum state.
Now consider n noninteracting copies of the system and the two states:
|ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 · · · (15)
|φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 · · · (16)
As n increases, the two states become more and more orthogonal (their scalar product
gets smaller and smaller, which means that the angle between them gets larger and
larger). It follows that, for sufficiently large n, there is some state |χ〉 orthogonal to
|ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 · · ·that is arbitrarily close to |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 · · ·. If |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 · · ·
is assigned 1, the state |χ〉 is assigned 0.
So if two nonorthogonal states are both assigned 1, and we take sufficiently many
noninteracting copies of the system, there will exist two states in the tensor product
Hilbert space that are closer than any given angle, such that one of the states is as-
signed 1 and the other 0. From Bell’s result, it follows that there is a set of additional
rays in this tensor product Hilbert space from which it is possible to derive a Kochen-
Specker contradiction, i.e., it is impossible to assign these additional rays 0’s and 1’s
noncontextually and also assign the two close rays 0 and 1 without violating orthogo-
nality constraints.
Of course, Bell’s proof of the corollary to Gleason’s theorem and the Kochen-
Specker proof assume noncontextuality, that the same ray is assigned the same value
in different orthogonal sets. What PBR have shown is that you can avoid the noncon-
textuality assumption and still get a contradiction.
If the two rays |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 · · · and |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 · · · are both assigned 1, and
1 is also assigned to all the other possible tensor combinations of |ψ〉’s and |φ〉’s (all
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n-strings of |ψ〉’s and |φ〉’s, for sufficiently large n) then—this is what PBR prove—
there exists one (maximal) orthogonal set in the 2n-dimensional Hilbert space, i.e., a
basis, that cannot be colored with 0’s and 1’s consistently with 1’s assigned to the 2n
nonorthogonal rays (i.e., it is impossible to assign all but one of these basis rays 0
and also assign all the 2n nonorthogonal rays 1 without violating orthogonality con-
straints). So noncontextuality does not arise. In effect, the noncontextuality assumption
is avoided by considering many noninteracting copies of a system and assuming that
each of the copies can be prepared in a given quantum state independently of the oth-
ers, and that this also applies to ontic states, so that there are no ‘supercorrelations’ at
the ontic level and the ontic state of the composite many-copy system is specified by
the set of independent ontic states of the copies.
Bell rejected his own proof of the corollary to Gleason’s theorem because he thought
the noncontextuality assumption was not physically motivated [3, p. 9]:
. . . it relates in a nontrivial way the results of experiments which cannot
be performed simultaneously; the dispersion free states need not have this
property, it will suffice if the quantum mechanical averages over them do.
His nonlocality theorem [2] was an attempt to derive a similar conclusion from a phys-
ically motivated assumption. So one could say that the PBR result is an ingenious way
of proving what Bell originally wanted to prove.
There is a similar result by Colbeck and Renner [13, abstract]:
Here we show, based only on the assumption that measurement settings
can be chosen freely, that a system’s wave function is in one-to-one corre-
spondence with its elements of reality. This also eliminates the possibility
that it can be interpreted subjectively.
The ‘free choice’ assumption that measurement settings can be chosen freely is
the assumption that a measurement setting can be chosen independently of any in-
formation that is in principle available before the choice of measurement setting, i.e.,
independently of any pre-existing value of any parameter, in any frame of reference.
The Colbeck-Renner investigation amounts to considering the following issue: Bell’s
nonlocality theorem [2] established that the correlations between certain measurement
outcomes for a bipartite system in a certain pure entangled quantum state cannot be
attributed to common causes in the common past of the two systems. A parameter
λ is a common cause of correlations if, conditional on λ, the correlations vanish. In
other fords, the joint probabilities are conditionally statistically independent, condi-
tional on the common cause. Conditional statistical independence is equivalent to the
conjunction of two conditions: parameter independence and outcome independence.8
Parameter independence (Bell locality) is the assumption that, conditional on λ, Al-
ice’s marginal probabilities are independent of Bob’s measurement setting choices,
and conversely. Outcome independence is the assumption that, conditional on λ, Al-
ice’s marginal probabilities are independent of Bob’s measurement outcomes, and con-
versely. Parameter independence is well-motivated because, assuming access to λ, if
8The terminology is due to Abner Shimony [26]. For a proof of the equivalence here, see [9, pp. 66–67].
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this assumption were violated, then instantaneous signaling would be possible.9 But
outcome independence does not have the same plausibility. If parameter independence
is violated, instantaneous signaling between Alice and Bob would be possible, given
access to λ, because they choose the measurement settings. If outcome independence is
violated, they cannot exploit the violation to signal instantaneously, even given access
to λ, because measurement outcomes are random and not under their control. They can
choose the measurement settings, but not the measurement outcomes. So it is an inter-
esting question to consider whether one can prove a ‘no go’ theorem from parameter
independence without assuming outcome independence: is an extension of quantum
mechanics with improved predictive power possible, where the extended theory satis-
fies parameter independence but not necessarily outcome independence?
Colbeck and Renner prove a result that answers the question negatively: no ex-
tension of quantum mechanics can improve predictability unless the extension is such
that, for measurements on a bipartite system in a pure entangled state, parameter inde-
pendence is violated: Alice’s marginal probabilities in the extended theory would have
to depend on Bob’s measurement setting choices.This is a stronger version of Bell’s
nonlocality theorem.
As we saw in §1 in the discussion of the measurement problem for a PR-box, if Bob
has access to a parameter or ontic state λ that completely specifies the output values for
both of his possible inputs, or even specifies whether these output values are the same
or different (a more coarse-grained specification), then either there is a violation of the
no-signaling principle, or Alice’s choice of input is not free but depends on the value
of λ. Since the alternative here depends on whether Bob obtains information about λ
before or after Alice’s input, a violation of the no-signaling principle entails a violation
of Alice’s freedom to choose her input, and conversely.
A violation of the no-signaling principle, given λ, is a violation of parameter inde-
pendence. The ‘free choice’ condition in the Colbeck-Renner theorem includes condi-
tionalization with respect to the quantum state and ontic state λ, or the values of any
hidden variables (since none of this is in the future light cone of the choice of measure-
ment setting).10 So a violation of the ‘free choice’ condition in the Colbeck-Renner
theorem is equivalent to a violation of parameter independence.
We can see the significance of the Colbeck-Renner result by considering what one
might call ‘Bohm’s theory for a PR-box.’ First note that a PR-box converts the truth
value of the conjunction of the inputs (with 0 corresponding to ‘false’ and 1 correspond-
ing to ‘true’) to the parity of the outputs.11 So one could generate the correlations of
a PR-box from a box with an internal stochastic mechanism that produces outputs for
given inputs in a way that depends on the temporal order of the inputs:
9The no-signaling principle does not refer to any hidden variables or ontic states. Rather, the condition is
that Alice’s marginal probabilities, given the quantum state, are independent of Bob’s measurement setting
choices or, more generally, independent of anything Bob does. The no-signaling principle is parameter
independence averaged over the hidden variables—an operational or phenomenal condition.
10In both the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph analysis and the Colbeck-Renner analysis, nothing precludes the
possibility that the quantum state could be part of the ontic state, or all of the ontic state. The ‘hidden
variable’ terminology suggests that the full ontic state is the quantum state together with additional hidden
variables. A ‘no go’ theorem for hidden variables therefore establishes that the quantum state is ontic, i.e.,
‘the whole story.’
11
‘Outputs same’ = parity 0; ‘outputs different’ = parity 1.
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if x occurs before y then, with equal probability, a = 0 and b = x · y, or a = 1 and
b = x · y ⊕ 1
if y occurs before x then, with equal probability, b = 0 and a = x · y, or b = 1 and
a = x · y ⊕ 1
if x and y occur simultaneously then, with equal probability, a = 0 and b = x · y, or
a = 1 and b = x · y ⊕ 1, or b = 0 and a = x · y, or b = 1 and a = x · y ⊕ 1
This produces the PR-box correlations a ⊕ b = x · y, and Alice’s marginal prob-
abillities are both 1/2 independent of Bob’s input, and similarly for Bob’s marginals.
So this box is non-signaling and phenomenally indistinguishable from a PR-box. Note
that an output value, 0 or 1, is produced with probability 1/2 irrespective of the remote
input value, or whether there was any remote input value at all.
There is, however, a big difference between the box as defined above and a PR-box,
although the two boxes are empirically equivalent. In a PR-box, the temporal order of
the inputs is irrelevant, and the correlations arise as a global feature of the statistics. In
the box defined above, the temporal order of the inputs is relevant to the output values
obtained, which requires the assumption of a preferred foliation in space-time. Since
the output values are separately defined as functionally related to the inputs, depending
on the order of the inputs, and the correlations arise from these functional relations,
one could construct a nonlocal deterministic hidden variable theory for the correlations
as a causal explanation of the correlations in terms of the hidden variable as a common
cause—hence ‘Bohm’s theory for a PR-box.’
Suppose the internal mechanism—the additional mathematical machinery in this
extension of a PR-box—involves a register that keeps track of which input occurs first,
or whether the inputs occur simultaneously, and a device with a hidden variable, λ,
uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. If x occurs before y, the device stores the input x and
produces an output a = 0 if λ < 1/2 and a = 1 if λ ≥ 1/2. When the input y occurs
some time later, the device passes both inputs through an AND gate. If λ < 1/2, the
output of the AND gate is transferred to Bob’s output b. If λ ≥ 1/2, then 1 is added
(mod 2) to the output of the AND gate before it is transferred to Bob’s output b. A
similar sequence occurs if y occurs before x, with a and b switched. If the two inputs
occur simultaneously, the device passes both inputs through the AND gate. If λ < 1/4,
the device produces outputs a = 0 and b = x·y; if 1/4 ≤ λ < 1/2, the device produces
outputs a = 1 and b = x · y ⊕ 1; if 1/2 ≤ λ < 3/4, the device produces outputs b = 0
and a = x · y; if 3/4 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the device produces outputs b = 1 and a = x · y ⊕ 1.
Averaging over the hidden variables yields the PR-box correlations.
For a given value of the hidden variable λ, the Bohm box violates the no-signaling
principle because Alice’s input is revealed in Bob’s output. That is, the Bohm box
violates parameter independence. Suppose, for example, that Alice inputs 0 or 1 before
Bob. If λ < 1/2:
• p(b = 0|x = 0, y = 1) = 1
• p(b = 1|x = 1, y = 1) = 1
Similarly, if λ ≥ 1/2 and Bob’s input is y = 1, then Bob’s output is 1 if Alice’s
input is 0, and 0 if Alice’s input is 1. So Alice and Bob could signal with a supply
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of Bohm boxes if they could control or measure the value of λ. Alternatively, if Bob
obtains information about the value of λ before Alice’s input, there is a constraint on
Alice’s freedom of choice. Averaging over λ precludes the possibility of signaling and
restores ‘free choice.’ This is like Bohm’s theory for quantum mechanics, which allows
instantaneous signaling in principle, given sufficient control over the hidden variables.
In Bohm’s theory, conflict with experience is avoided because measurements cannot
yield enough information about the hidden variables to allow signaling or violate ‘free
choice,’ assuming a certain equilibrium distribution for the hidden variables, which the
theory guarantees will be maintained once achieved.
A Bohm box illustrates the significance of the Colbeck-Renner result. In a Bohm
box, the dynamics of the internal mechanism—the register and the device with the
AND gate—would have to function instantaneously to simulate the correlations of a
PR-box, which are assumed to be maintained for arbitrary separations of the Alice and
Bob inputs and outputs. The internal mechanism violates parameter independence, i.e.,
access to the internal mechanism would allow instantaneous signaling, or violate ‘free
choice.’ If there is no access in principle to the internal mechanism, then a Bohm box
and a PR-box are empirically indistinguishable and nothing can rule out the possibility
that a PR-box is really a Bohm box with an intrinsically hidden internal mechanism. A
similar observation applies to Bohm’s theory and quantum mechanics.
For all we know, Bohm’s theory might be true. But one might say the same for
Lorentz’s theory in relation to special relativity, insofar as it ‘saves the appearances.’
Lorentz’s theory provides a dynamical explanation of phenomena, such as length con-
traction, that are explained kinematically in special relativity in terms of the structure
of Minkowski space-time. The theory does this at the expense of introducing mo-
tions relative to the aether—a preferred foliation in space-time—that are in principle
unmeasurable, given the equations of motion of the theory. Similarly, Bohm’s theory
provides a dynamical explanation of quantum phenomena, such as the loss of infor-
mation on measurement, which are explained kinematically in quantum mechanics in
terms of the structure of Hilbert space, at the expense of introducing the positions of the
Bohmian particles, which are in principle unmeasurable more precisely than the Born
distribution in the equilibrium theory, given the equations of motion of the particles.
5 The Measurement Problem
One could interpret the PBR result and the Colbeck-Renner result as showing that, at
the fundamental level, systems are not characterized by an Einsteinian ‘being thus’ or
‘So-sein.’
The conclusion the authors draw is rather that the quantum state is ontic. For PBR,
the quantum state could be part of the full ontic state, as in Bohm’s theory, or it could
be the whole ontic state. For Colbeck-Renner, the possibility of adding anything to
the ontic state is excluded if we assume parameter independence or, as they prefer
to put it, ‘free choice.’ The only alternative possibility is a psi-epistemic view along
the lines of Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation, or Fuchs’ QBism, but this is dismissed
as ultimately just old-fashioned instrumentalism, and the objection to instrumentalism
as an interpretation of quantum mechanics is that it fails to address the measurement
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problem. For the instrumentalist, quantum mechanics is a theory about measurement
outcomes, so how a measuring instrument produces definite outcomes remains outside
the theoretical story.
Here is how Bohm puts the measurement problem [5, p. 583]:
If the quantum theory is to be able to provide a complete description
of everything that can happen in the world . . . it should also be able to de-
scribe the process of observation itself in terms of the wave functions of
the observing apparatus and those of the system under observation. Fur-
thermore, in principle, it ought to be able to describe the human investi-
gator as he looks at the observing apparatus and learns what the results of
the experiment are, this time in terms of the wave functions of the vari-
ous atoms that make up the investigator, as well as those of the observing
apparatus and the system under observation. In other words, the quantum
theory could not be regarded as a complete logical system unless it con-
tained within it a prescription in principle for how all these problems were
to be dealt with.
The measurement problem is a consistency problem. What we have to show is that
the dynamics, which generally produces entanglement between two coupled systems,
is consistent with the assumption that something definite or determinate happens in a
measurement process. The basic question is whether it is consistent with the unitary dy-
namics to take the macroscopic measurement ‘pointer’ or, in general, the macroworld
as definite. The answer is ‘no,’ if we accept an interpretative principle sometimes re-
ferred to as the ‘eigenvalue-eigenstate link.’
Dirac’s states the principle as follows [14, pp. 46–47]12:
The expression that an observable ‘has a particular value’ for a particu-
lar state is permissible in quantum mechanics in the special case when a
measurement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular value, so
that the state is an eigenstate of the observable. . . . In the general case we
cannot speak of an observable having a value for a particular state, but we
can speak of its having an average value for the state. We can go further
and speak of the probability of its having any specified value for the state,
meaning the probability of this specified value being obtained when one
makes a measurement of the observable.
Dirac’s principle, together with the linearity of the unitary dynamics of quantum
mechanics, leads to the measurement problem: the definiteness or determinateness of
a particular measurement outcome is inconsistent with the entangled state that linearity
requires at the end of a measurement. Typically, the measuring instrument is a macro-
scopic system, like Schro¨dinger’s cat, where the cat states |alive〉 and |dead〉 are corre-
lated with eigenstates of a microsystem in the final entangled state at the end of the dy-
namical interaction. Here the macroscopic cat states act as measurement pointer states
12 One finds similar remarks in von Neumann [28, p. 253] and in the EPR paper [16]. The EPR argument
is formulated as a reductio for the principle: EPR show that it follows from the principle, together with
certain realist assumptions, that quantum mechanics is incomplete
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for the eigenvalues of the measured observable of the microsystem. Schro¨dinger’s point
was that, while we might find the indefiniteness of a microsystem in a superposition
acceptable, we surely would not want to say that the cat is indefinite with respect to
being alive or dead when it is entangled with a microsystem, i.e., when the composite
cat-microsystem is in a superposition of alive and dead cat-states.
In quantum mechanics, the transition in a measurement process from a state |s〉, in
which the event s is definite according to the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, to a different
nonorthogonal state |t〉, in which the event t is definite, with probability |〈t|s〉|2 is a
stochastic transition that is not described by the unitary dynamics of the theory. Since
the event s was definite before the measurement and is now, in the state |t〉 after the
occurrence of the measurement outcome t, indefinite, so the probability of finding t in
a measurement is less than 1, there is a loss of information on measurement or, as Bohr
put it, an ‘irreducible and uncontrollable’ measurement disturbance. As we saw in §1,
this is a general feature of any no-signaling theoretical explanation of correlations that
are outside the local correlation polytope.
Just as Lorentz contraction is a physically real phenomenon explained relativisti-
cally as a kinematic effect of motion in a non-Newtonian space-time structure, so the
change arising in quantum conditionalization that involves a real loss of information
should be understood as a kinematic effect of any process of gaining information of
the relevant sort in the non-Boolean possibility structure of Hilbert space, considered
as a kinematic framework for an indeterministic physics (irrespective of the dynamical
processes involved in the measurement process). The definite occurrence of a particu-
lar event is constrained by the kinematic probabilistic correlations represented by the
subspace structure of Hilbert space, and only by these correlations—it is otherwise
free.
The eigenvalue-eigenstate link is an interpretative principle, a stipulation about
when an observable ‘has a particular value,’ that is not required by the kinematic struc-
ture of quantum mechanics. Alternative stipulations are possible. In particular, no
contradiction is involved in stipulating that some particular ‘preferred’ observable, R,
is always definite (as long as we don’t stipulate other noncommuting observables as
also definite).
The following lattice-theoretic theorem [11] (see [18] for a C∗-algebraic general-
ization, and [19] for a topos-theoretic generalization) characterizes all possible stipula-
tions, subject to some minimal constraints: If R is a preferred observable in this sense
(stipulated as always definite, i.e., as always having a determinate value), and e is the
ray representing a pure quantum state, there is a unique maximal sublattice L(R, e) in
the lattice of Hilbert space subspaces representing quantum propositions, such that:
• elements of L(R, e) can be simultaneously definite in the state e
• L(R, e) contains the spectral projections of the preferred observableR
• L(R, e) is defined byR and e alone (i.e., L(R, e) is invariant under Hilbert space
lattice automorphisms that preserve R and e)
Although L(R, e) is not a Boolean algebra, in general, there are sufficiently many13
13But not sufficiently many to distinguish every pair of distinct elements, as there is in a Boolean algebra.
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2-valued homomorphisms (corresponding to truth-value assignments) on L(R, e) so
that a probability measure can be defined on L(R, e), such that the probability of an
element a in L(R, e) given by the quantum state e is just the measure of the set of
2-valued homomorphisms that assign 1 to a.
The elements in L(R, e) are obtained by projecting e onto the eigenspaces of R.
These projections, together with all the rays in the subspace orthogonal to the span
of the projections, generate L(R, e). In the case of Schro¨dinger’s cat, if we take R
as the cat-observable with eigenstates |alive〉 and |dead〉, then it follows that the cat
is definitely alive or definitely dead in the entangled state after the interaction with
the microsystem, and the microsystem property correlated with the cat being definitely
alive or the cat being definitely dead is also definite in the final entangled state.
The eigenvalue-eigenstate link, or Dirac’s principle, amounts to the stipulation that
the preferred observableR is the identity I , which has the whole Hilbert space and the
null space as the two eigenspaces. There is a sense in which the eigenstate-eigenvalue
link is preserved by the new stipulation. If a system S is not entangled with the deco-
herence pointer R, so that the total state is a product state |s〉 ⊗ · · ·, where |s〉 is the
state of S, then the decoherence ‘pointer’ takes the form I ⊗R, where I is the identity
in the Hilbert space of S, and the definite S-properties according to the above theorem
are as specified by the eigenstate-eigenvalue link.
If we take R as the decoherence ‘pointer’ selected by environmental decoherence,
then it follows that the macroworld is always definite because of the nature of the de-
coherence interaction coupling environmental degrees of freedom to macroworld de-
grees of freedom (a contingent feature of the quantum dynamics), and it follows from
the theorem that features of the microworld correlated with R are definite. In other
words, decoherence guarantees the continued definiteness or persistent objectivity of
the macroworld, if we stipulate that R is the decoherence ‘pointer.’
The argument here is not the usual argument that decoherence provides a dynamical
explanation of how an indefinite quantity becomes definite in a measurement process—
Bell [4] has aptly criticized this argument as a ‘for all practical purposes’ (FAPP) solu-
tion to the measurement problem. Rather, the claim is that we can take the decoherence
pointer as definite by stipulation, and that decoherence then guarantees the objectiv-
ity of the macroworld, which resolves the measurement problem without resorting to
Copenhagen or neo-Copenhagen instrumentalism. In effect, the theorem shows that
you can take the different histories associated with the branching structure in an Ev-
erettian interpretation of quantum mechanics as possible histories, one of which is the
actual history. So there is no need to invoke the Everettian multiverse to solve the
measurement problem.
The consistency argument does not, of course, explain how an individual mea-
surement outcome is selected out of all possible outcomes. This is a feature of any
no-signaling theoretical explanation of correlations that lie outside the local correla-
tion polytope. In a simplex theory, it is possible to give a dynamical account of how
an individual measurement outcome is selected as a dynamical transition from one ver-
tex of the simplex to another. For correlations that cannot be simulated in a simplex
theory, there is no analogous dynamical account, because any such account would be
inconsistent with the no-signaling principle. The appropriate answer to the question
about how an individual measurement outcome is selected in a quantum measurement
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process—how ‘the transition from the possible to the actual’ comes about—is that this
occurs ‘freely,’ as a truly random event, consistent with the probabilistic correlations
of the quantum convex set. There is nothing more that needs to be said or can be said
about how the trick is done.
6 Concluding Remarks
We know how to solve the measurement problem: Bohm’s theory is a solution, the
Everett interpretation is a solution, the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory [17] is a rival
theory that avoids the measurement problem. The debate continues because there is
nothing like a general consensus that any of these proposals are getting it right. Ein-
stein commented in a letter to Max Born [7, p. 192] that Bohm’s theory ‘seems too
cheap to me.’ One might say the same about all these solutions: they explain away the
irreducible indeterminism of quantum mechanics, rather than providing a conceptual
framework for thinking about a universe in which, to put it somewhat anthropomorphi-
cally, a particle is free to choose its own response to a measurement, subject only to
probabilistic constraints, which might be nonlocal.
The transition from classical to quantum mechanics rests on the recognition that the
structure of information is not what we thought it was: there are probabilistic correla-
tions that lie outside the polytope of local correlations, and so cannot be simulated by
‘shared randomness’ or common causes. The ‘no go’ theorems tell us that we can’t ex-
plain these correlations in terms of a classical simplex theory by supposing that some-
thing has been left out of the story. The nonclassical features of quantum mechanics,
including the irreducible information loss on measurement, are generic features of any
no-signaling theoretical explanation of correlations that lie outside the local correlation
polytope. Fundamentally, the conceptual problem is how to make sense of this—how
to understand a nonlocal box theory. A large part of the difficulty is removed by see-
ing that the inconsistency in reconciling the entangled state at the end of a quantum
measurement process with the definiteness of the macroscopic pointer reading and the
definiteness of the correlated value of the measured micro-observable is only apparent
and depends on a stipulation that is not required by the structure of the quantum possi-
bility space. Replacing this stipulation by an alternative consistent stipulation resolves
the problem.
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